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ABSTRACT 
Marriott International Inc. diversified continuously, absorbing the development 
opportunities that the environment offered. It managed to survive critical times of recession 
and crisis. Diversification changed the company into what it is today - a giant in the hotel 
business, whose branches have extended to five continents. The purpose of this case study 
was to determine if Marriott International Inc. added value through diversification from 1970 
to 2000. Six diversification decisions were made that changed Marriott from a foodservice to 
a hotel firm. These diversification decisions were related to: (1) theme parks, (2) Courtyard 
by Marriott (entrance to the moderate-priced hotel business), (3) Marriott Suites (entrance to 
the corporate living business), (4) acquisition of Residence Inns, (5) acquisition ofRitz-
Carlton (entrance to the luxury hotel business), and ( 6) acquisition of Renaissance Hotel 
Group. 
The research examined each diversification decision following three major steps: (1) 
identification of the diversification opportunity and explanation of why it was important to be 
included in this study, (2) analysis of operating performance measures including sales, net 
income, earnings per share, sales growth rate, net income growth rate, earnings per share 
growth rate, and net profit margin, and (3) comparison of the closing price of common stock 
for Marriott and its competitors. 
Despite the limitations of this case study and the limited connection between specific 
diversification decisions and operating and market performance, findings from this research 
suggest that changing from a foodservice to a hotel firm added value. Moreover, this type of 
research can serve as a foundation for additional studies attempting to explore and quantify 
the relationship between diversification and value in the hospitality industry. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Marriott International Inc. is one of the success stories in the hospitality industry. Of 
interest is how this company, that began in May 1927 as a root beer stand, has been 
transformed into one of the world's most important hotel companies. The firm diversified 
continuously from its inception, absorbing the development opportunities that the 
environment offered. It also managed to survive critical times of recession and crisis. 
Diversification drove the company towards what it is today - a giant in the hotel business, 
whose branches have extended to five continents. 
The goal of any company is to maximize investors' wealth (Ross, Westerfield & 
Jordan, 2000). In this respect, cash flows are needed to recover capital investments, reward 
investors, and contribute to firm development. To recover capital investment means to 
generate profit equal to that invested. To reward investors is to increase owners' value and, 
ultimately, to pay dividends according to the company's dividend policy. Development of the 
firm includes increased sales, assets, number of employees, market share, and/or creation and 
marketing of new products. When a firm is capable of achieving these objectives, one can 
say a firm is successful. In essence, a firm adds value (Ross et al., 2000). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this case study was to determine if Marriott International Inc. added 
value through diversification from 1970 to 2000. Six important diversification decisions were 
analyzed. However, as shown later in this study, only five of these decisions added value to 
the company. Moreover, not all of Marriott's diversification decisions directed the firm into 
the hotel industry. 
The dramatic changes that transformed Marriott from a root beer stand into the 
today's lodging giant offer a unique opportunity for an in-depth study of the rationale for top 
management's diversification decisions and the impact of those decisions on Marriott's 
value. This study answers the following research questions: 
1. What were the conditions that prompted Marriott to diversify into the hotel 
business? 
2. What opportunities did the environment offer to Marriott? 
3. Did Marriott add value through diversification? 
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Such questions are difficult to address in the context of a large sample study because 
each firm has its unique history, management skills, and opportunities. To find the answers to 
these questions, this study focused on a single firm - Marriott International Inc. Another 
reason to do a case study is that by analyzing a single firm, it is possible to capture, analyze, 
and discuss elements involved in the diversification process. 
Importance of the Study for Hospitality Industry 
Previous research attempting to determine the relationship between diversification 
and value did not yield consistent results (Chen & Ho, 2000). In some cases, diversification 
added value while in others it did not (Berger & Ofek, 1995, 1996; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; 
Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1997; Hubbard & Palia, 1999; John & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 
1994; Lewellen, 1971; Liebeskind & Opler, 1994; Servaes, 1996). There have been no 
studies that examined the relationship between diversification and value in the hospitality 
industry, thus, it is important to examine it in the context of this industry. 
Marriott's diversification decisions were examined because it is important to know if 
diversifica{ion can add value to companies in the hospitality industry. If diversification is 
proven to add value and improve performance, then hospitality firms should consider it a 
strategic management tool. On the contrary, if diversification decreases the value of 
hospitality firms, then companies should avoid it and concentrate on other means to add 
value and improve performance. 
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Companies are inseparable from the environment in which they perform. According 
to Aldrich (1979), the environment affects organizations by making available or withholding 
resources. A firm's performance depends on how well these resources are managed. 
Basically, from a strategic standpoint, the most successful firms are those that fit best in the 
industry environment - by seizing opportunities and avoiding threats (Ross et al., 2000). 
However, diversification is a process that takes a great deal of time and energy on behalf of 
the strategic decision makers. Because a multitude of factors (e.g. business environment, the 
general status of the economy, and global economic trends) influence firms, one cannot 
discuss diversification as a separate concept. Instead, firms' diversification must be examined 
in the context of the general business and economic environment. As diversification appears 
as an option to interact with the environment, it is important that corporate officers carefully 
consider all diversification opportunities. Within the hospitality industry this may mean 
entering new geographic markets, market sectors, or, as Marriott has so aptly shown, 
changing from a food company to a hotel corporation. 
Definitions of Terms 
The following terms and definitions are used in this study: 
Diversification: The expansion of a company in form or content, in order to reduce 
the dependence arising from specialization, or to exploit better the factors of production 
(Avneyon, 1987). 
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Diversified company: For the purpose of this study, a diversified company is one that 
does business in a certain market of hospitality industry and extends to another market within 
the same industry. In this respect, for example a company that owns and operates restaurants 
will be diversified if it acquires a hotel and operates it, diversifying itself from restaurant to 
hotel business, and vice versa. Moreover, if a company owns a type of hotels and acquires 
another type, it is diversification (e.g. Starwood Hotels and Resorts acquisitions) 
Acquisition: A process in which one company takes controlling interest in another 
company (Downes & Goodman, 1998). 
Merger: "A merger is a combination of two or more companies, either through a 
pooling of interests, where the accounts are combined; a purchase, where the amount paid 
over and above the acquired company's book value is carried on the books of the purchaser 
as goodwill; or a consolidation, where a new company is formed to acquire the net assets of 
the combining companies. Strictly speaking, only combinations in which one of the 
companies survives as a legal entity are called mergers." (Downes & Goldman, 1998, p. 36) 
The classification of mergers is done in terms of their economic function, from a 
horizontal merger (combining direct competitors in the same product line and markets), a 
vertical merger (combines customer and company or supplier and company), a market 
extension merger (combines selling the same products in different markets), a product 
extension merger (combines selling different but related products in the same market), and a 
conglomerate merger (combines companies with none of the above relationships and 
similarities) (Downes & Goodman, 1998). 
Spin-off: "A form of corporate divestiture that results in a subsidiary or division 
becoming an independent company" (Downes & Goodman, 1998, p. 63). Spin-offs also can 
be accomplished through leveraged buyouts by the subsidiary or division's management, or 
through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) (Downes & Goodman, 1998). 
Performance: For the purpose of this study, performance will refer to the overall 
financial situation of the company studied - Marriott International Inc. Performance will be 
analyzed based on two approaches: operating performance and market performance. 
Operating performance will refer to a change in accounting numbers while market 
performance will refer to a change in the price of Marriott's shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
Value added: "Value of the output of a production firm after deduction of the input 
purchased from without" (Avneyon, 1987, p. 474). In the context of this study, to add value 
means to maximize shareholders wealth by increasing market and operating performance. 
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This literature review presents theoretical background on diversification, operating 
and market performance, and the relationship between diversification and performance to 
support the analysis of Marriott. Because there is little hospitality industry research 
discussing diversification, performance, and the relationship between them, the literature 
review concentrates on studies from manufacturing. 
Research on Diversification 
A review of literature reveals several studies on diversification (Keats, 1990; Rumelt, 
1974; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). However, no known studies directly related to 
diversification in the hospitality industry were found; therefore, the theoretical concepts and 
definitions for this study are borrowed from manufacturing. There are, of course, a few 
differences between hospitality and manufacturing firms. Because manufacturing firms 
usually have larger and different types of inventories than hospitality firms, the methods 
employed in operating performance analysis differ. Also, manufacturing firms typically are 
not as labor intensive as hospitality firms. However, accounting for these differences, the 
firms from both industries (manufacturing and hospitality) are subject to the same financial 
regulations. Therefore, the theoretical concepts analyzing the relationship between 
diversification and value discovered for manufacturing firms may apply to hospitality firms. 
Companies strategically decide to diversify their product lines and this decision may 
modify the fundamental nature of the firm. Moreover, diversification.may involve an 
important redeployment ofresources and redirection of human energy (Rumelt, 1974). 
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Diversification is neither a goal nor a plan. Instead, it is a tool that corporate officers use to 
increase firm performance (Rumelt, 1974). To add value through diversification, firms must 
know what new sector of business they are going into, past strengths and competitive 
advantages upon which to build, and the degree of diversification needed to gain maximum 
performance (Rumelt, 1974). 
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There is not one all encompassing definition of diversification. It is believed that 
diversification occurs when a company enters another industry while others agree that 
diversification occurs when a firm sells products that are just slightly different than the 
products they traditionally sell. Rumelt (1974) argues, that the absence of a clear definition of 
diversification is a good thing. It allows researchers to develop their own concept of 
diversification, and adapt the concept to fit best his/her research interests. 
A company's diversification strategy is defined as "the company's commitment to 
diversity per se, together with the strengths, skills or purposes that span the diversity, shown 
by the way in which business activities are related one to another" (Rumelt, 1974, p. 29). 
Rumelt stated that any firm's diversification strategy can be described as corresponding to 
one of the following categories: 
1. Single businesses: firms committed to a single business. These firms have an end-
product business of 95 percent or more of total revenues coming from one industry 
(e.g. Hilton International Company and Hyatt Hotels Corporation). 
2. Dominant businesses: firms that have diversified to some extent but the major part 
of their revenue comes from a single business (e.g. Starwood Hotels and Resorts 
Worldwide). However, this category of firms has three sub-categories: 
a. Dominant vertical: firms that produce a variety of end-products but none of 
them contribute more than 95 percent to total revenues (e.g. Choice Hotels 
International). 
b. Dominant-constrained: firms that have diversified building on some 
particular strengths, skills, or resources associated with the original dominant 
activity. These activities are all inter-related and related to the core business 
(e.g. MGM). 
c. Dominant-unrelated: firms in which the diversified activities are not related 
to the main business (e.g. CSX). 
3. Related businesses: firms that are diversified and that diversification was 
accomplished by relating new activities to old ones (e.g. Marriott International 
Corporation and Accor). This category of firms also has sub-categories: 
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a. Related-constrained: firms that have diversified mainly by relating new 
businesses to a specific central skill or resource. Each business activity is 
related to almost all of the other business activities (Hyatt Hotels and Resorts). 
b. Related-linked: firms that have diversified mainly by relating new 
businesses to a specific central skill or resource, but not always the same 
strength or skill (e.g. Radisson Hotels and Resorts). 
4. Unrelated businesses: firms that have diversified regardless ofrelationship 
between new business and current activities (e.g. Cendant Corporation and Gaylord 
Entertainment). There are two sub-categories: 
a. Acquisitive conglomerates: firms that have aggressive programs for 
acquisition of new unrelated businesses. 
b. Unrelated-passive: unrelated businesses that do not qualify as acquisitive 
conglomerates (Rumelt, 1974, pp. 29-32). 
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Therefore, diversification is a very good way to enter new markets and, therefore, it is 
an important strategic management tool. However, it is important to assess the success or 
failure of diversification. In other words, did diversification add value to the company? 
Research on Performance 
Literature dedicated to performance in the hotel industry has been limited to studies 
on individual hotels or geographically on a national or regional level (Smith & Lesure, 1996). 
No study has been found to discuss hotel performance across the hotel industry (Horton, 
1999). Therefore, similar to the studies of diversification mentioned earlier, major 
performance concepts were adapted from research done in manufacturing and applied to the 
hotel/lodging industry. 
Firm performance has been defined in different ways depending on the goals of the 
researcher and data available (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). For the purpose of this 
case study, two firm performance constructs are necessary: operating performance and 
market performance. 
Operating performance. To determine a firm's financial condition, its operating 
performance must be assessed. To do this, a series of financial indicators are examined as 
measures of operating performance. These measures are reliable and valid for the 
measurement of firm's operating performance and used in numerous studies (Keats, 1990; 
Rumelt, 1974; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). Keats and Hitt (1988) suggested that 
operating performance measures have a historical perspective on firm performance, while 
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market performance measures are more futuristic. Rumelt (1974), a pioneer in the study of 
firms' performance, defined ten measures useful in determining operating performance. 
These measure are: (a) annual rate of growth in sales, (b) annual rate of growth in earnings 
after taxes and preferred dividends, ( c) annual rate of growth in earnings per common share, 
(d) relative standard deviation of year-to-year variation of earnings per share to the average 
long-term uniform growth trend, (e) price-earnings ratio of common stock, (f) after-tax return 
on invested capital (net income plus interest divided by invested capital), (g) after-tax return 
on equity (net income less preferred dividends divided by book equity), (h) ratio of book 
equity to invested capital, and (i) internal-financing ratio defined as the ratio of the market 
value of added equity to earnings after taxes (annual retained earnings plus market value of 
new shares issued divided by earnings after tax and preferred dividends) (Rumelt, 1974). 
Several other ratios have been showed important to describe a firm's operating 
performance. Return on equity (ROE) was analyzed by previous researchers (Ross et al., 
2000) because it showed a link among three operating performance measures: profit margin, 
total asset turnover, and the equity multiplier. This link is reflected in the Du Pont identity: 
profit margin as a measure of operating efficiency, total asset turnover as a measure of asset 
use efficiency, and the equity multiplier as a measure of financial leverage (Ross et al., 








Net Income Assets -----l)---
Total Equity Assets 
Sales Net Income Assets 
--l) l)-----
Sales Assets Total Equity 
Net Income Assets -----l)-----
Assets Total Equity 
Net Income Sales Assets 
l) l)-----
Sales Assets Total Equity 
Therefore, ROE =Profit Margin X Total Asset Turnover X Equity Multiplier 
(Ross et al., 2000, pp. 68-69) 
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Because return on equity can be decomposed in profit margin, total asset turnover, 
and the equity multiplier it can be used as an appropriate measure for operating performance. 
The net profit margin is a measure of the net income dollars generated by each dollar in sales. 
Therefore, it shows a direct link between revenue and expenses. Ultimately, the net profit 
margin shows how profitable a firm is and, therefore, it is an appropriate measure of a firm's 
performance (Child, 1974). 
Market performance. The second category of performance measures is based on the 
market performance of the firm. Two commonly used measures for market performance are 
the price-to-earnings ratio (P-E ratio) and the market-to-book ratio (Horton, 1999). 
To analyze a firm's market performance, risk must be taken into account because risk 
has an important effect on market performance measures. There are two types of risk: 
systematic and unsystematic risk. Ross et al. (2000) stated that a surprise in the market 
affecting a large number of investments represents systematic risk. Uncertain things can 
happen in the economy and they can affect the general economic conditions. Gross domestic 
product, interest rates, and inflation are examples of systematic risk. These factors affect all 
the companies in the market. For example, inflation affects negatively not only hospitality 
companies, but also all companies doing business in the economy. As opposed to systematic 
risk, unsystematic risk is defined as risk on a single asset or a small number of assets. 
Examples of unsystematic risks include a strike or a CEO resignation. For example, a strike 
may have impact only on one company, and is not likely to affect the economy as a whole. 
Only systematic risk is important to determine the expected return because systematic risk is 
linked to more general disturbances in the business environment (Ross et al., 2000). 
Although Sharpe (1999) suggests that the relationship between market performance 
and operating performance is artificial, it is legitimate to include both market and operating 
performance analysis when examining Marriott International Inc. The reason is that in the 
end, the purpose is to assess the overall financial situation of Marriott. Moreover, either 
market or operating performance analysis may capture a distinct impact of diversification, 
not visible through a single analysis. 
Research about the Relationship between Diversification and Performance 
Managers and researchers do not always concur on the relationship between 
diversification and performance. Corporate diversification has both costs and benefits (Chen 
& Ho, 2000). Firms may take advantage of diversification through the creation of internal 
capital markets (Williamson, 1970), higher debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1992), and economies of scope (Teece, 1980). 
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Firms in pursuit of related diversification perform best through internal diversification 
because they use internal skills and avoid transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). On the other 
hand, firms in pursuit of unrelated diversification succeed best through acquisition because it 
offers firms the ability to buy the new skills necessary to compete in an unfamiliar market 
(Dundas & Richardson, 1982). Using data from the mid 1970s, Bettis and Hall (1982) found 
that the related diversifiers performed better than the unrelated firms. However, the situation 
changed when multinational firms were included in the sample. Palich, Carini, and Seaman 
(2000) argued that the trend of prior inconsistent findings about the relationship between 
diversification and performance might result not from an invalid theoretical framework but 
from a shift in the dynamics of relatedness synergies for international firms. 
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Recent literature shows that corporate diversification strategies are associated with 
value loss and that, oppositely, increasing corporate focus is value-enhancing (Berger & 
Ofek, 1995, 1996; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Denis et al., 1997; John & Ofek, 1995; Lang & 
Stulz, 1994; Liebeskind & Opler, 1994; Servaes, 1996). These studies suggest that the cost of 
diversification outweighs the benefits (Chen & Ho, 2000). Moreover, in a recent case study 
about Sears' decisions to diversify into financial services Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin 
(2000) presented evidence that the expected synergies did not materialize through 
diversification, and as a result Sears' retail performance deteriorated. Because of the pressure 
from institutional investor activists in 1992, Sears announced the divestiture of financial 
services and refocused on retail operations. 
According to Lamont and Polk (2002) the diversification problem has two 
explanations. First, it could be that diversification itself somehow destroys value. Second, it 
could be that diversification and lower value are not causally related, but merely reflect 
firms' endogenous choices. For example, maybe firms with low value choose to diversify, 
leading to a negative correlation between diversification and value. This diversification 
further lowers their value. Lamont and Polk also argue that a possible explanation for the 
diversification discount is the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis, whereas 
diversified firms invest inefficiently - spending too little on good segments and too much on 
bad segments. Other possible explanations of why diversification decreases value are that 
managers have limited expertise in newly diversified areas and cannot effectively take charge 
of diversified businesses, or unrelated segments have conflicting operational styles (Lamont 
& Polk, 2002). 
Despite many studies showing a decrease in firm value due to diversification, several 
studies (Hubbard & Palia, 1999; Lewellen, 1971) predict a positive relationship between 
diversity and value. Lewellen (1971) found that diversity of cash flow variation is good if it 
allows greater tax benefits of leverage by reducing the volatility of cash flows and the 
probability of financial distress. Studying acquisitions in the 1960s, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) found that gains are greatest when a financially unconstrained buyer acquires a 
constrained target. The existing literature on corporate diversification is based mainly on 
U.S. data, which would reflect U.S. corporate behavior and capital market environment 
(Chen & Ho, 2000). 
Although many studies attempted to find a relationship between diversification and 
value, there is no evidence of studies about this relationship in the hospitality industry. 
Therefore, the results from previous studies based on firms from industries other than 
hospitality will be applied to the present case study on Marriott International Inc. 
Based on the evidence that diversification is associated with both a reduction and an 
increase in a firm's value (Van Oijen & Douma, 2000), the important question remains why 
do firms diversify? Given that Marriott diversified continuously from a root beer stand to 
today's multinational lodging corporation, this study examines whether Marriott increased or 
lost value through continuous diversification. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
The study attempts to determine if Marriott International Inc. added value through 
diversification, from 1970 to 2000. Therefore, the company has been examined with respect 
to its major diversification decisions from 1970 to 2000. To determine if value was added, 
the effect of Marriott's diversification decisions on the firm's performance was determined 
by examining the change in the price of Marriott's shares traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the change in the following accounting numbers and ratios: sales, net income, 
earnings per share, sales growth rate, net income growth rate, earnings per share growth rate, 
and net profit margin. The analysis of the change in stock prices and accounting numbers was 
necessary to show that Marriott's diversification decisions affected the firm's value. 
To determine the impact of Marriott's diversification decisions on operating 
performance, several selected financial indicators were calculated and compared for quarter 
t0 (before the decision) and t1 (after the decision), as well as for several subsequent quarters. 
To diminish the effect of seasonality, sales, net income, and earnings per share growth rates 
were calculated using the difference between the current and the previous quarter's sales, net 
income, and earnings per share, divided by the previous quarter's sales, net income, and 
earnings per share. The formulas used in calculation of the operating performance measures 
are presented in Appendix. 
Financial information from Marriott International Inc. website, The Wall Street 
Journal, and Standard and Poor 's Daily Stock Price Record were analyzed. These sources of 
data provided financial information about Marriott's operations from 1970 to 2000. Quarterly 
and annual publicly available income statements, balance sheets, earnings digest press 
releases, stock performance charts, and analysts' reports were analyzed. This analysis 
permitted extracting the ratios of interest for the study and permitted the computation of 
others not present in those sources. In order to capture the real picture of Marriott's financial 
performance and to observe the real impact of each diversification decision on Marriott's 
value, it was necessary to examine quarterly data. For a company of this size, annual reports 
are not likely to capture the real impact of diversification decisions on the firm's 
performance, providing instead a holistic picture of what happened to the company during 
the entire year. The ratios were compared quarter to quarter to see the performance impact of 
diversification decisions under discussion. 
The Wall Street Journal was reviewed starting with the year 1968 (the year that 
Marriott was listed for the first time on the New York Stock Exchange). Each article related 
to Marriott was analyzed, with respect to the diversification decision under discussion. The 
analysis consisted of a separate examination of each diversification decision. Therefore, the 
discussion of each diversification decision follows the sequence of steps presented below: 
1. Identification of diversification decision and explanation of why it is important to 
be included in this study. News articles were reviewed to reveal information about Marriott's 
intentions to diversify towards theme parks, moderate-priced hotels, residence hotels, 
corporate living, luxury hotels, and international operations. After all diversification 
decisions were enumerated, only six of them were selected based on the newness of that 
market to Marriott and the magnitude of financial resources required to accomplish each 
decision. After the diversification decisions were selected, financial data from news articles, 
stock market reports, and quarterly and annual financial statements were reviewed. 
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2. The operating performance measures (sales, net income, earnings per share, sales 
growth rate, net income growth rate, earnings per share growth rate, and net profit margin) 
(Horton, 1999; Rumelt, 1974) were examined one quarter prior to the diversification decision 
and one quarter after the diversification decision. This showed Marriott's operating 
performance pre and post diversification. If the measurements for operating performance 
improved in the quarter subsequent to the diversification event under discussion, it was 
concluded that the diversification decision helped the overall performance improve. It can be 
said that through the diversification decision under discussion Marriott improved 
performance and, therefore, added value. 
3. Comparisons of the closing price of common stock for Marriott and its competitors 
were made on the day prior (t1), the day after announcement (t1), and day the diversification 
decision was publicly announced (t0). Growth from t 1 to t1 is an indicator that diversification 
had a positive impact on market performance. This method indicates market price 
fluctuations due to diversification (Gillan et al., 2000). Announcement dates were taken from 
The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. Marriott's stock 
prices were represented graphically against time in the same plot with the competitors for the 
time periods analyzed from 1970 to 1998. 
The announcement refers to the first time Marriott declared the intention to diversify 
into a new business. The market performance analysis was made only on the first 
announcement because the market is less likely to show an impact to the following 
announcement related to the same diversification decision once the investors are aware that 
the company is going towards a new market (Gillan et al., 2000). 
CHAPTER 4. BACKGROUND ON MARRIOTT'S DIVERSIFICATION DECISIONS 
Description of Marriott's Business 
Major milestones in Marriott's history. To accomplish the goals in this case study, it 
is important to present a brief history of the company. This historical overview shows how 
the Marriott family achieved success through wisely engaging in diversification processes. 
Basically, the history of Marriott is an illustration of continuous diversification. 
The Marriott family started in the restaurant business and in more than 70 years 
developed one of the world's largest lodging firms. The evolution of Marriott and its 
diversification provide an interesting case study for examining the impact of strategic 
decisions by a hospitality corporation. 
The major milestones in Marriott's history were: 
s 1927: J. Willard Marriott and his wife Alice started a small restaurant called Hot 
Shoppe. 
s 1937: Hot Shoppes pioneered airline catering, serving meals for Eastern, American, 
and Capital Airlines. 
s 1947: Hot-Shoppes opened industrial cafeterias at General Motors and Ford Motor 
plants in Georgia and Virginia. 
s 1953: The company went public. 
s 1957: Marriott opened its first hotel: Twin Bridges in Arlington, VA. 
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s 1964: The company changed the name to Marriott-Hot Shoppes Inc. and went into the 
fast-food business as a response to the new fast food trend. 
s 1967: The company changed the name again to Marriott Corporation. 
s 1972: Marriott entered Sun Line cruises partnership and announced plans to develop 
theme parks. 
s 1983: The company consolidated its lodging division. Courtyard by Marriott was the 
company's first brand dedicated to the moderate-price lodging market. 
s 1985: Marriott acquired Gladieux Corporation and Service System Corporation, 
transforming the firm into one of the major foodservice contract companies in the 
United States in addition to being a major hotel corporation. 
s 1990: The eradication of communism in Eastern Europe and threat of war in the 
Middle East made the company's 20% profitability benchmark more difficult to 
achieve. 
s 1991: Marriott announced the intention to split into two major companies: Host 
Marriott charged with the ownership of hotels, and Marriott International, the 
management services company. This split became official in 1993. 
s 1996: Host Marriott Corporation divided into two separate companies. Host Marriott 
continued to own hotels and real estate while Host Marriott Services Corporation 
operated concessions at airports, on tollroads, and at sports and entertainment 
attractions. 
s 1996: Marriott International Inc. introduced what they called an "all-suite economy 
hotel" - Fairfield Suites by Marriott. Marriott International acquired Forum Group, 
Inc., a leading operator of senior housing and merged it with Marriott's Senior Living 
Services business. 
s 1997: Marriott International acquired Renaissance Hotel Group and added three 
brands (Renaissance, Ramada International, and New World), doubling Marriott's 
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presence overseas in 1997. 
s 1998: Marriott International completed its spinoff of Sodexho. The result was the 
"New" Marriott International and Sodexho Marriott Services. The "New" Marriott 
International consists of full-service lodging, select service lodging, extended stay 
and corporate lodging, ownership resorts, and senior living communities (Marriott, 
2001a, 2001b). 
Marriott's Major Diversification Decisions 
20 
As previously stated, this study will focus on Marriott's diversification decisions from 
1970 to 2000 that allowed it to change from a foodservice firm to one of the world's largest 
hotel companies. From 1970 to 2000, many diversification decisions were made. However, 
only decisions that changed Marriott from a foodservice to a hotel firm were analyzed. These 
diversification decisions were: 
s 1972 - 1976: theme parks diversification 
s 1983 - 1984: Courtyard by Marriott- entrance to the moderate-priced hotel business 
s 1984: Marriott Suites - entrance to the corporate living business 
s 1987: acquisition of Residence Inns 
s 1995: acquisition of Ritz-Carlton - entrance to the luxury hotel business 
s 1997 acquisition of Renaissance Hotel Group -Marriott International added three 
brands (Renaissance, Ramada International, and New World) and doubled Marriott's 
presence overseas. 
Marriott's diversification decisions were divided by decade (1970-1979, 1980-1989, 
and 1990-1999). Each decision was made to enter a new business, not common to Marriott to 
that point. In the 1970s, the diversification decision was to develop theme parks. In the 
1980s, the company developed three separate hotel brands for three different markets: 
Courtyard by Marriott, Marriott Suites, and Residence Inns. The 1990s diversification 
decisions were the acquisitions of Ritz-Carlton and Renaissance. 
Diversification Decisions in the 1970s 
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The intention to diversify into theme parks appeared in 1971 and continued to 
preoccupy Marriott executives in 1972 and 1973. To that date, theme parks were greatly 
expanding in the U.S. and Marriott executives saw a strategic opportunity for adding value to 
the company by diversifying into this market. Stimulated by the great success of Disneyland 
in California and Six Flags over Texas, Marriott hoped to relieve the average American of 
money by opening theme parks for entertainment and recreation. In 1971, U.S. companies 
opened 10 big theme parks, and there were plans to open another 12 over the next few years 
("Marriott proposes", 1973). The success of these parks contributed a great deal to the 
construction of others, bigger and more attractive: Disney World in Florida and Six Flags 
over the Midwest in Saint Louis. An increased number of companies tried diversification into 
theme parks: Warner Bros. Arts Ltd. opened Jungle Habitat in West Millford, NJ, Hershey 
Foods Corp. built Chocolate World, and NLT Corp. (an insurance holding company) opened 
the Opryland in Nashville, TN ("Marriott theme park'', 1973). 
Marriott hoped to gain a competitive advantage through diversification over its major 
competitor at the time-McDonalds Corp., which was not diversified. McDonald's was 
considered the main competitor of Marriott because the core business was foodservice and 
the size of the two corporations was very similar. 
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On January 27, 1972, Marriott officially announced the intention to build its first 
theme park, aiming to "rival or exceed" any of the currently operating entertainment centers 
in America. The park was to be located midway between Washington and Baltimore, near 
Columbia. The cost of the complex would exceed $65 million, be called "Great America", 
and consist of a 100-acre park with rides, a marine life park, a drive-through animal preserve, 
and a 40-store shopping mall. The construction was scheduled to start in fall of 1972 with 
completion by 197 5. However, the company hoped to open a shopping mall and a 400-600-
room hotel by the end of 1974. 
Marriott officials began discussions with the officials in Prince William County, VA. 
On February 6, 1972, a Marriott's spokesman publicly announced that the company wished 
to purchase about 550 acres near Manassa contingent on rezoning the area. The park was to 
be opened in 1975 or 1976. The Great America theme park would be the same as that 
initially planned for the Baltimore-Washington area. In 1973 Marriott declared that the board 
of supervisors of Prince William County, VA approved rezoning of land to permit 
development of the Great America theme park. The $35 million development was contingent 
upon the availability of adequate sewage capacity and obtaining adequate access to the park 
("Marriott says", 1973). 
In the second half of 1972, Marriott planned to build another Great America theme 
park in California. This park would be located in Santa Clara, CA, and would operate 140 
days a year. The park would be based on the same Great America concepts and would consist 
of 150-acre theme park and 275-acre industrial park. Construction was approved by Santa 
Clara officials in March 1973, and began in subsequent months. The park would be opened 
to public in 1975 or 1976. 
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The third Marriott Great America theme park was announced on January 30, 1973 
and was planned for Gurnee, IL. The park would cost $40 million and operate 120 days a 
year. Marriott intended to buy 650 acres ofland west of Waukegan in Lake County, IL. 
Although the company did not disclose specific details about this new park, the analysts and 
reporters assumed it would be similar to the two Great America theme parks proposed for the 
east and west coasts. 
Diversification Decisions in the 1980s 
Courtyard by Marriott - diversification into the moderate-priced hotel market. At the 
beginning of 1983, Marriott had already penetrated the hotel market, as it owned a total of 
118 full service hotels. At that time, most of the hotels and motels charged $60 to $100 for a 
room. ("Marriott plans to open", 1983). To sell more rooms, Marriott decided to diversify 
into the economy hotel market, the lodging industry's largest segment at that time. On June 
7, 1983, Marriott made a public announcement about expansion into a new market: the 
moderate-price hotel market ("Marriott is seen", 1983) 
Market research indicated the existence of a lot of unhappy customers in the 
moderate-price segment, so Marriott decided to go on with the $2 billion Courtyard project. 
Marriott officials were happy with the way Courtyard added to the company. The key to 
success was eliminating expenses like banquet rooms and bellmen while still making the 
customers satisfied by retaining amenities such as swimming pools and restaurants (Wayne, 
1985). 
The new Courtyard by Marriott hotels were built similar to country inns, having two 
stories and 130 to 150 rooms each, in contrast with the spacious traditional hotels. The 
operating systems developed for these hotels allowed Marriott to be cost competitive while 
providing better value through superior guest recognition and personal service. 
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For this new diversification step, Marriott wanted to start with an experiment. The 
company would build only a small number of hotels and observe the market reaction. If the 
market's reaction was encouraging, similar hotels would be built. At the beginning, they built 
five hotels in Georgia (three in Atlanta, one in Augusta, and one in Columbus). Each hotel 
had two stories and 125-150 rooms, a small restaurant, a cocktail lounge, and a courtyard 
containing a pool ("Marriott is seen", 1983). 
Because profit margins were smaller (12%) in limited service hotels priced at $35-45 
a room, compared to 28% in full service hotels priced at $50 a room, Marriott was expected 
to add refinement to the new Courtyard by Marriott hotels to set them apart and attract more 
customers. Due to favorable economic conditions, the segment of population with incomes 
over $40,000 a year was expected to increase. Because this population segment was 
considered a source of customers for Courtyard by Marriott hotels, this increase encouraged 
Marriott officials to go on with this diversification decision. 
In 1984, the experiment was evaluated and considered successful. In June 1984, 
Marriott declared the intention of consolidation into the moderately priced lodging market by 
building an additional 20 to 30 Courtyard by Marriott hotels during the following 18 months. 
The new Courtyard by Marriott hotels would charge $35 to $55 for a room and were located 
in areas such as New Jersey/New York, Washington/Baltimore, Northern California, 
Chicago/Milwaukee, and Georgia ("Marriott will build", 1984). 
Marriott Suites - diversification into the full-service suites hotel market. The all-
suites business marked Marriott's second diversification decision in the 1980s. Trying to 
consolidate its position in the lodging market, Marriott developed a new type of hotel to 
address needs of customers who prefer a suite to a traditional hotel room. The concept was 
seen as complementary to the company's traditional hotel business. In a public 
announcement dated September 11, 1984 they said they would build 12 Marriott Suites 
hotels by 1988 ("Marriott slates plans", 1984). 
At the time of the announcement, Marriott did not know the exact location of its first 
Marriott Suites hotel, although they were expected to start building in the spring of the 
following year. Marriott Suites hotels would be built in suburbs and in some downtown 
areas. Marriott wanted each of the new suites to have a bedroom plus bathroom and a living 
room. Marriott Suites were designed to compete directly with other companies already in the 
suites hotel market such as Hyatt and Hilton. That market represented one to two percent of 
the total hotel-room market in 1985 (Horwitz, 1985). 
According to the company's spokesmen at the time, each hotel would have 200 to 
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275 suites and limited meeting space, and rates would range from $70 to $90. ("Marriott 
slates plans", 1984). Guests would receive a complimentary breakfast in the hotel's 
restaurant. Marriott declared that they had been watching the market for a long time and they 
were aware of the existence of a solid demand for this kind of hotel. J. W. Marriott said their 
decision was to move quickly in this segment to take full advantage of the growth potential. 
As a result of these diversification efforts, Marriott opened the first suite hotel (224 rooms) in 
Atlanta in 1987. Three additional full-service suite hotels were scheduled to open in 1988. 
Residence Inns - diversification into the moderate-price suite hotel market. In July 
1987, Marriott purchased all of the assets of The Residence Inn Company, an owner, 
operator, and franchisor of moderate price suite hotels (Sugawara, 1988). The units in the all-
suite Residence Inns, located mostly in the Midwest, had full kitchens and fireplaces, and 
many had more than one bedroom. Residence Inns targeted the extended stay market, 
consisting primarily of business and family travelers who would stay more than five 
consecutive nights. Room rates varied based on length of stay. Residence Inn hotels were 
planned to have 100 to 125 studios and a two-story penthouse suite. Each inn was planned to 
include a series of residential style buildings with landscaped walkways, courtyards, and 
recreational areas. The specific feature was that these hotels did not have restaurants but still 
offered continental breakfast; most provided a "complimentary evening hospitality hour". At 
the time of purchase, Residence Inns had 93 hotels open and 40 under construction or 
development. Located mostly in the Midwest, Residence Inns were very attractive. 
At the beginning of 1988, out of a total of 106 Residence Inns hotels, Marriott 
operated 18 Residence Inns and 38 others were under management agreements. Also, 50 
establishments were franchisee-operated. In 1988, Marriott wanted to sell its ownership in 15 
Residence Inns to a limited partnership. They wanted to continue this trend and, as the 
company announced publicly in 1988, planned to open 11 more Residence Inns in 1988. 
Moreover, they considered opening approximately 300 Residence Inns (including franchised 
operations) totaling over 35,000 suites by the mid-1990s. Also, 11 Marriott-operated 
Residence Inns were scheduled to open in 1988. On September 8, 1988, Marriott announced 
plans to spend $1 billion to build 177 Residence Inns, as they continued to diversify from 
traditional full-service hotels to other rapidly growing markets. Some of the Residence Inns 
would be franchises, but the majority would be built by Marriott and sold to investors 
(Sugawara, 1988). Marriott would continue to manage them providing Marriott steady cash 
flow to finance the $1 billion expansion. 
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Diversification Decisions in the 1990s 
The diversification of Marriott in the 1990s marked two main directions in 
diversification: (1) luxury hotel market and (2) international lodging. At the beginning of the 
1990s, Marriott had a solid position in the U.S. hotel market (Tomkins, 1995). By 1995, 
Marriott wanted to diversify more into new sectors and to capture market potential. 
Therefore, they went into the luxury market and increased their presence abroad. 
Ritz-Carlton - diversification into the luxury hotel market. While most of Marriott 
hotels charged $50-100 a room in the mid 1990s, Marriott wanted to capture the upper 
segment of the hotel market -luxury clients who would spend more dollars for exceptional 
amenities and services. By 1995, Marriott had only six luxury hotels. They did not want to 
build more luxury hotels of their own, instead, they wanted to buy a chain with a reputation 
for luxury, which would fill Marriott's biggest clientele gap. The luxury chain Ritz-Carlton 
owned three hotels and held management contracts on another 31. Despite Ritz-Carlton's 
commitment for quality, their profitability was questionable (Tomkins, 1995). At the time of 
the acquisition (1995), Ritz-Carlton had been searching for investors to help finance the 
company's continued expansion in Europe and Asia (Faiola, 1995). So Ritz-Carlton was a 
good diversification opportunity for Marriott. Marriott provided Ritz-Carlton access to 
Marriott's financial resources, reservations system, and worldwide sales force. The 
acquisition was expected to strengthen the Ritz-Carlton properties and encourage growth of 
the chain. 
Marriott announced publicly on March 6, 1995 their agreement to purchase a 
minority interest in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., with the intention of taking over the 
company. They agreed to buy 49% of Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. for an estimated $200 million 
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(Faiola, 1995). The deal was scheduled to close during spring of 1995, and Marriott could 
later acquire the rest of the company. However, Marriott was not buying any of the Ritz-
Carlton hotels, which were mostly franchised, only the right to manage them (McDowell, 
1995). 
Renaissance Hotels - diversification into the international hotel market. At the 
beginning of 1997, Marriott operated 1,075 hotels in the U.S. They had 75 hotels overseas, 
but they wanted to provide their international travelers the same service quality. Therefore, 
they aimed to increase their presence abroad. As J. W. Marriott, Jr. declared in 1997, they 
became a global company. As a global company, Marriott would enter into direct 
competition with chains like ITT Sheraton, the Hilton Hotels Corporation, and Accor, which 
already had a significant presence in the international hotel market. 
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By 1997, Renaissance Hotel Group, an international company based in Hong Kong, 
operated or franchised hotels and resorts under three well-established brand names: 
Renaissance (a quality international brand for business and leisure travelers), New World (a 
quality hotel brand in Asia and the Pacific region), and Ramada International (a mid-priced 
lodging brand outside of the U.S. and Canada). 
Marriott announced publicly on February 18, 1997 their intention to acquire the 
Renaissance Hotel Group. As part of the acquisition, Marriott had a strategic alliance for 
future hotel development with the Hong Kong-based New World Development Co., Ltd., the 
principal Renaissance shareholder prior to the transaction. After this deal, for the first time in 
the company's 40-year history, it would have hotels in Japan, Italy, China, Russia, India, and 
Turkey (McDowell, 1997). 
Marriott estimated this acquisition would increase earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization by $75 million to $85 million in the first twelve months but 
would reduce 1997 fiscal year net income by between 10 and 14 cents a share. However, 
Marriott's executives argued that the company would expect strong growth in future years 
through aggressive hotel expansion and cost savings. 
Summary 
In the 1970s, Marriott decided to diversify into theme parks. Stimulated by the 
success of other companies that built theme parks, Marriott started to build the first two 
theme parks in 1972. Marriott's theme parks went into operations in 1976. In the 1980s, 
Marriott diversified into the moderate-price hotels (Courtyard by Marriott), suites hotels 
(Marriott Suites), and moderate-price suites hotels (Residence Inns). In 1983, Marriott 
decided to build a smaller number of Courtyards by Marriott hotels to see if they are 
profitable. Upon an evaluation of results, in 1984, they decided to continue opening more 
Courtyards by Marriott. In 1984, Marriott wanted to consolidate its position in the full-
service suites hotel market. Therefore, they developed the Marriott Suites. The new hotels 
were successful and Marriott continued to build more hotels of this kind. In 1987, Marriott 
purchased all the assets of Residence Inns Company. These hotels were located in Midwest 
and were attractive to Marriott. In 1988, Marriott announced plans to open more Residence 
Inns. In the 1990s, diversification took two directions: luxury and international markets. In 
1995, Marriott acquired the Ritz-Carlton hotel chain and consolidated its position in the 
luxury hotel market. In 1997, Marriott acquired the Renaissance Hotel Group, adding three 




Results of the analysis of financial data related to each diversification decision are 
presented in this section. Market and operating performance analyses were performed to 
determine if Marriott added value through diversification. Market performance analysis was 
done with respect to the change in closing stock prices of Marriott shares the day prior (t_1), 
the day of (to), and the day after (t1) the announcement of each diversification decision. 
Changes were positive, indicating positive market reaction to each decision and, therefore, 
the investors' confidence in the decision. Operating performance analyses were done by 
comparing (1) sales, (2) net income, (3) earnings per share, (4) sales growth rate, (5) net 
income growth rate, (6) earnings per share growth rate, and (7) net profit margin for the 
quarter prior to and after each new business started operations for Marriott. Despite natural 
seasonal fluctuations, it was found that these operating performance measures improved in 
the fiscal quarters subsequent to the start of each newly added brand. 
The results are reported chronologically, relative to the decade during which each 
diversification decision was made. Table 1 summarizes the market performance analysis for 
the theme parks diversification decision. Table 2 presents financial data related to operating 
performance analysis of the theme parks diversification decision. Tables 3, 4, and 5 
summarize respectively the data for market and operating performance analyses for the 
diversification decisions made in the 1980s (Courtyard by Marriott, Marriott Suites, and 
Residence Inns). Tables 6, 7, and 8 summarize the data for operating the market and 
operating performance analyses for the diversification decisions made in the 1990s (Ritz-
Carlton and Renaissance). 
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Diversification Decisions in the 1970s 
Results of the market performance analysis. The theme park diversification decision 
delivered both positive market returns and positive operating returns. Table 1 presents the 
closing prices per share from the day before the announcement, the day of the announcement, 
and the day after the announcement, respectively. 
Table 1 
Marriott Corp. selected per share data January 26, 1972 to January 28, 1972 
Day Announcement Closing Trend• Actual 
price per retumb 
share (%) 
January 26, 1972 Before announcement $57.50 +$0.50 0.87% 
January 27, 1972 Marriott announced plans to build a theme $58.75 +$1.20 2.17% 
park between Washington and Baltimore 
January 28, 1972 After announcement $60.63 +$1.80 3.19% 
•The trend was calculated for the closing stock price (t0-t. 1). 
bThe actual return was calculated for the closing stock price ((t0-t_ 1)/t_1)x I 00%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is "Closing prices on New York Stock Exchange", 1972a, 1972b, 1972c. 
As presented in Table 1, the stock price climbed from $57.50 prior to the 
announcement to $58.75 (+$1.20 increase) on the day of the announcement. However, the 
stock market reacted even more positively the day after the announcement, as the closing 
price per share climbed to $60.63 (+$1.80 increase). This was an indication that Marriott's 
shareholders had a positive attitude towards the decision of going into the theme parks 
business. 
Results of the operating performance analysis. The first Great America theme park 
started operations in 1976. The other two theme parks in Santa Clara, CA and Gurnee, IL 
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were opened to the public in 1976. That is why it is necessary to analyze the firm's 
operations starting with the beginning of 1976. The fiscal quarter ofreference is the one 
ended May 1976. Table 2 presents financial data from 1976. 
Table 2 
Selected quarterly financial data for Marriott Corp. 1976 
Quar- Sales Net income Common Earnings Sales Net Income EPS growth Net profit 
ter (million$) (million$) shares per share growth growth 
ratec margind 
ended (million) (EPS) rate• rateb (%) (%) 
($) (%) (%) 
Feb. $242.85 $6.86 32.70 $0.21 29.18% -6.94% -5.03% 2.83% 
1976 
May $203.93 $7.58 33.98 $0.22 -16.02% 10.45% 6.32% 3.72% 
1976 
Oct. $238.90 $10.15 35.57 $0.29 17.14% 33.89% 27.91% 4.25% 
1976 
•The quarterly sales (S) growth rate= (St1-St0)/St0xl00%. 
bThe quarterly net income (NEI) growth rate= (NEit1-NEit0)/NEit0xl00%. 
cThe quarterly earnings per share (EPS) growth rate= (EPSt1-EPSto)/EPSt0xl00%. 
dThe quarterly profit margin (NPR) = NElt0/St0 xlOO%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is "Digest of earnings reports", 1976a, 1976b, 1976c. 
As visible in Table 2, Marriott did not have an increase in sales during this quarter 
(ending May 1976) compared to the previous quarter. However, Marriott experienced an 
increase in net income of 10.45% compared to the prior quarter. Also, the company 
experienced earnings per share growth of 6.32% compared to the quarter ended February 
1976. The net profit margin increased as well to 3.72% from 2.83% during the quarter ended 
February 1976. The profit after tax growth rate and earnings per share growth rate increased 
and indicated an increase in efficiency at Marriott. 
Based on the data from the Tables 1 and 2, although sales decreased in the quarter 
ended May 1976, the main indicators of operating performance (net income growth rate, 
earnings per share growth rate, and profit margin) increased. However, the increase in these 
measures while sales decreased does not necessarily conclude that the theme parks opening 
improved Marriott's operating performance. 
Diversification Decisions in the 1980s 
Diversification in the 1980s consisted of three decisions: Courtyard by Marriott, 
Marriott Suites, and Residence Inns. The market performance analysis was done for these 
diversification decisions made in the 1980s together. In addition, because all three brands 
started to operate approximately simultaneously, these three decisions were analyzed 
together to determine the impact on operating performance. 
Results of the market performance analysis. To determine the market reaction, the 
days of interest were the day prior to the Courtyard by Marriott, Marriott Suites, and 
Residence Inns decisions announcements (June 6, 1983, September 10, 1984, and April 29, 
1987 respectively), the day of the announcements (June 7, 1983, September 7, 1984, and 
April 28, 1987, respectively), and the day after the announcements (June 8, 1983, September 
11, 1984, and April 30, 1987, respectively). Table 3 presents the closing stock prices and 
returns for Marriott from June 6-8, 1983, September 7-11, 1984, and April 28-30, 1987 




Marriott Corp. selected per share data June 6-8, 1983, September 7-11, 1984, and April 28-
30, 1987 
Day Announcement Closing Trenda Actual 
price per retumb(%) 
share 
June 6, 1983 Before announcement $71.50 +$0.30 0.42% 
June 7, 1983 Marriott announced plans to build five $73.00 +$1.50 2.09% 
moderate-price hotels in Georgia (Courtyard 
by Marriott) 
June 8, 1983 After announcement $72.00 -$1.00 -1.37% 
September 7, 1984 Before announcement $73.01 -$0.02 -0.04% 
September 10, 1984 Marriott announced plans to build the first $74.01 +$1.00 1.36% 
Marriott Suites 
September 11, 1984 After announcement $74.01 $0.00 0.00% 
April 28, 1987 Before announcement $37.07 +$1.04 2.88% 
April 29, 1987 Marriott announced plans to enter the $38.02 +$0.95 2.56% 
moderate price suite hotel market 
April 30, 1987 After announcement $39.01 +$0.99 2.60% 
arhe trend was calculated for the closing stock price (to-t,). 
bThe actual return was calculated for the closing stock price ((to-t1)/t1)x100%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is Standard and Poor's (1983, 1984, 1987). 
For the decision to diversify into Courtyard by Marriott, the trading day before the 
announcement, June 6, 1983, Marriott's closing price per share was $71.50. During the day 
of the announcement (June 7, 1983), the stock price climbed to $73.00 a share. During the 
next day (June 8, 1983) the stock dropped and reached $72.00 a share at close. However, the 
increasing trend showed the second day after the announcement was made (June 9, 1983), 
when closing price jumped to $74.70 a share. This increase in Marriott's stock prices the day 
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of the announcement meant that the investors were confident in this decision. The stock price 
increased from $71.50 to $73.00 a share after the announcement indicating positive market 
reaction suggesting Marriott's investor confidence. 
For the Marriott Suites diversification decision market performance analysis started 
with the announcement made on September 11, 1984. The days of interest were the trading 
day prior to the first expansion announcement (September 7, 1984), the day of the 
announcement (September 11, 1984), and the day after the announcement (September 12, 
1984). 
It was observed that investors were not very reactive. However, the fact that the 
closing price jumped from $73.01 a share a day before the announcement to $74.01 a share 
the day of the announcement indicates that Marriott achieved confidence from investors. The 
closing stock price stayed above $74.01 a share after the day of the announcement for three 
consecutive days. 
To analyze the impact on performance of Residence Inns diversification decision, the 
market performance analysis started with the announcement made on April 29, 1987. The 
days of interest were the day prior to the first announcement (April 28, 1987), the day of the 
announcement (April 29, 1987), and the day after the announcement (April 30, 1987). 
From the stock market data, it looked like the closing stock prices climbed steadily in 
the days leading up to the announcement. Marriott's stock prices jumped from $37.07 on 
April 28 (a day before the announcement), up to $38.02 a share on April 29, 1987 (the day of 
the announcement). After that day, the stock prices continued to climb to $39.01 a share on 
April 30, 1987. 
36 
Results of the operating performance analysis. To determine the impact on the 
operating performance, annual and quarterly financial data from 1983 to 1989 were analyzed. 
The operating performance measures are discussed. 
Tables 4 and 5 summarize annual and quarterly operating performance measures. 
Table 4 
Selected annual financial data for Marriott Corp. 1983-1989 
Year Sales Net income Common Earnings Sales Net Income EPS growth Net profit 
(million$) (million$) shares per share growth growth rate
0 margind 
(million) (EPS) rate" rateb (%) (%) 
($) (%) (%) 
1983 $2,950.50 $115.20 27.77 $4.15 NIA NIA NIA 3.91% 
1984 $3,524.90 $139.80 26.98 $5.18 19.47% 21.28% 24.82% 3.97% 
1985 $4,241.70 $167.40 27.00 $6.20 20.33% 19.77% 19.69% 3.95% 
1986 $5,266.50 $191.70 136.93 $1.40 24.16% 14.52% -77.42% 3.64% 
1987 $6,552.20 $223.00 133.53 $1.67 24.41% 16.33% 19.29% 3.40% 
1988 $7,370.00 $232.00 118.97 $1.95 12.48% 4.04% 16.77% 3.15% 
1989 $7,536.00 $177.00 112.03 $1.58 2.25% -23.71% -18.97% 2.35% 
"The annual sales (S) growth rate= (St1-St0)1St0xl00%,. 
bThe annual net income (NEI) growth rate= (NElt1-NEit0)/NEit0xl00%. 
cThe annual earnings per share (EPS) growth rate= (EPSt1-EPSt0)1EPSt0xl00%. 
dThe annual profit margin (NPR) = NEit01St0x 100%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is Marriott Corporation (1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1988a, 1988b, 1990a). 
Table 5 





















































































































































































Net Income EPS Net pro-
growth growth fit mar-
rateb ratec gind 
(%) (%) (%) 
NIA NIA 3.03% 
47.26% 45.71% 4.15% 
29.75% 29.41% 5.32% 
9.44% 8.82% 3.29% 
-25.71% -25.23% 3.10% 





-33.78% -33.76% 3.17% 
55.60% 53.85% 4.30% 
4.18% 4.37% 4.63% 
19.95% 19.38% 3.70% 
-33.85% -86.91% 3.32% 
52.34% 52.00% 4.78% 
43.86% 44.00% 3.80% 
14.23% 13.89% 3.04% 
-27.58% -26.83% 2.88% 
57.00% 56.67% 4.27% 
39.31 % 40.00% 3.79% 
8.82% 14.29% 2.91% 
-27.07% -25.00% 2.76% 











NIA 0.04% 48.17% -98.51% 
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"The quarterly sales (S) growth rate= (St1-St0)/Stoxl00% 
bThe quarterly net income (NEI) growth rate= (NEit1-NEit0)/NEit0xl00%. 
0The quarterly earnings per share (EPS) growth rate= (EPSt1-EPSt0)/EPSt0xl00%. 
dThe quarterly profit margin (NPR) = NElt0/St0xlOO%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is Marriott Corporation (1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 1987e, 1988a, 
1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, l 990a, 1990b ). 
As observable from Tables 4 and 5, sales grew very rapidly, from $351. 92 million in 
1983 to $7.53 billion in 1998. This fact was due to Marriott's fast growth strategy. A 
seasonal pattern was observed in the sales growth rates. According to this pattern, for every 
year from 1983 to 1989, the growth rate in each first quarter was negative, followed by a 
small positive rate in the second quarter, followed by a smaller positive rate in the third 
quarter, and completed with a high rate in the fourth quarter. This trend might be due to 
seasonality. 
Net income increased rapidly from 1983 to 1988, and dropped in 1989. Earnings per 
share increased in 1983, 1984, and 1985 ($4.15, $5.18, and $6.20 respectively). Between 
1994 and 1998 earnings per share maintained around $1.5. Earnings per share increased in 
1983, 1984, and 1985 ($4.15, $5.18, and $6.20 respectively) but dropped dramatically in 
1986 to $1.4 (-77.42% compared to the 1985). However, after 1986, earnings per share 
increased again in 1987 and 1988 (growth rates of 19.29% and 16.77% respectively), and 
dropped again in 1989. The net profit margin averaged around 3.48%. However, it showed a 
decreasing trend, with the lowest value in 1989 (2.36%). 
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In addition, to diminish the effects of seasonality, the analysis of operating 
performance also considered the sales, net income, and earnings per share growth rates 





















[-Quarterly sales growth rate - Quarterly net income growth rate C::J Quarterly earnings per share growth rate [ 
Figure 1. Sales, net income, and earnings per share growth rates adjusted for seasonality 
1984-1989. (Marriott Corporation, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 
1987e, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1990a, 1990b) 
The Figure 1 shows the graphic representation of sales, net income, and earnings per 
share growth rates calculated for the same quarter every year from 1983 to 1989, as well as a 
representation of the period of time when Courtyard by Marriott, Marriott Suites, and 
Residence Inns started operations for the parent company. Courtyard hotels started to operate 
in 1984 and continued to operate profitably since then. As visible from the graph, the start of 
Courtyard operations coincides with a steady increase in quarterly sales growth rate (around 
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20%). However, the quarterly net income and earnings per share growth rates decreased 
during that period (1984-1986). Also, Residence Inns and Marriott Suites started operations 
about during the same time (late 1980s). During that time, Marriott experienced a decreasing 
trend in quarterly rates of growth in sales, net income and earnings per share. The decrease in 
growth rates could not be an indication of improved performance resulting from 
diversification decisions in the 1980's (Courtyard, Marriott Suites, and Residence Inns). 
Diversification Decisions in the 1990s 
Diversification in the 1990s consisted of two decisions: acquisitions of Ritz-Carlton 
and Renaissance. The market performance analysis was done for both diversification 
decisions made in the 1980s. In addition, because both brands started to operate 
approximately simultaneously, both decisions were analyzed together to determine the 
impact on operating performance. 
Results of the market performance analysis. To determine the market reaction, the 
days of interest were the day prior to the announcements of the acquisitions of Ritz-Carlton 
and Renaissance (March 3, 1995 and February 14, 1997 respectively), the day of the 
announcements (March 6, 1995 and February 15, 1997 respectively), and the day after the 
announcements (March 7 and February 16, 1997 respectively) (McDowell, 1995, 1997). 
Table 6 presents the closing stock prices and returns for Marriott from March 3-7, 1995 and 
February 14-16, 1997. 
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Table 6 
Marriott Corp. selected per share data March 3-7, 1995 and February 14-16, 1997 
Day Announcement Closing Trend• Actual 
price per retumb (%) 
share 
March 3, 1995 Before announcement $31.25 +$0.12 0.38% 
March 6, 1995 Marriott announced plans to acquire 49% of $32.63 +$1.38 4.41% 
Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. 
March 7, 1995 After announcement $32.25 -$0.38 -1.16% 
February 14, 1997 Before announcement $55.25 +$0.62 1.13% 
February 18, 1997 Marriott announced plans to acquire $56.25 +$1.00 1.81% 
Renaissance Hotels 
February 19, 1997 After announcement $56.75 +$0.50 0.88% 
•The trend was calculated for the closing stock price (t0-t1). 
bThe actual return was calculated for the closing stock price ((t0-t1)/t_ 1)xl00%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is Yahoo finance (2002). 
The analysis started with the trading day prior to the announcement, March 3, 1995. 
The closing price was $31.25 a share, and jumped to $32.63 at close in the day of the 
announcement, March 6, 1995, up $1.38 a share. This indicated a very positive market 
reaction to this diversification decision. On the next day (March 7, 1995) the price dropped 
3 8 cents a share. 
To determine the impact on market performance of the Renaissance diversification 
decision, the market performance analysis was performed based on the data summarized in 
Table 5. The day before the announcement (February 14, 1997), the market closed at $55.25 
a share. The next transaction day (February 18, 1997), when the announcement was made, 
the closing price was $56.25 a share (up with $1.00 a share). This increasing trend continued 
during the day after the announcement (February 19, 1997), when the market closed at 
$56.75 (an increase of 50 cents a share). Examining the returns, it was observed a slight 
increase from 1.13% (February 14, 1995) to 1.81 %. 
The market performance analysis took into account the major events related to each 
diversification decision. Tables 1, 3, and 6 presented the closing stock prices from the days 
close to the announcement as well as the trend. All the announcements marked positive 
market reactions as closing stock prices from the announcement days went up with an 
average of $1.17 a share compared to the day prior to the announcement. The day after the 
announcement the closing price per share went up $0.31 a share compared to the day of the 
announcement. This reaction is an indication of investors' confidence in Marriott's 
diversification decisions. The day of the announcement marked an average return of2.57%, 
meaning confidence in each diversification decision. 
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Results of the operating performance analysis. To determine the impact on the 
operating performance, annual and quarterly financial data from 1983 to 1989 were analyzed. 
The operating performance measures are discussed. Tables 7 and 8 summarize annual and 




Selected annual financial data for Marriott Corp. 1994-1998 
Year Sales Net income Common Earnings Sales Net Income EPS growth Net profit 
(million$) (million$) shares per share growth growth 
ratec margind 
(million) (EPS) rate• rateh (%) (%) 
($) (%) (%) 
1994 $8,415.00 $200.00 132.45 $1.51 NIA NIA NIA 2.38% 
1995 $8,961.00 $247.00 132.09 $1.87 6.49% 23.50% 23.84% 2.76% 
1996 $10,172.00 $306.00 136.00 $2.25 13.51% 23.89% 20.32% 3.01% 
1997 $12,034.00 $335.00 136.18 $2.46 18.31 % 9.48% 9.33% 2.78% 
1998 $7,968.00 $390.00 267.12 $1.46 -33.79% 16.42% -40.65% 4.89% 
•The annual sales (S) growth rate= (St1-St0)1St0xl00%. 
hThe annual net income (NEI) growth rate= (NEit1-NElt0)/NElt0xl00%. 
cThe annual earnings per share (EPS) growth rate= (EPSt1-EPSt0)IEPSt0xl00%. 
dThe annual profit margin (NPR) = NElt0/St0xlOO%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is Marriott International Inc. (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000). 
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Table 8 
Calculated quarterly financial indicators 1994-1998 for Marriott International Inc. 
Sales Net income Common Earnings Sales Net Income EPS Net pro-
Year Quar- shares per share growth growth growth fit mar-(million$) (million$) ter (EPS) rate• rateb ratec gind (million) 
($) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1994 $1,916.0 $43.0 134.38 $0.32 NIA NIA NIA 2.24% 
2 $1,982.0 $48.0 133.33 $0.36 3.44% 11.63% 12.50% 2.42% 
3 $1,813.0 $37.0 132.14 $0.28 -8.53% -22.92% -22.22% 2.04% 
4 $1,701.0 $72.0 130.91 $0.55 -14.18% 50.00% 52.78% 4.23% 
1995 $2,013.0 $52.0 130.00 $0.40 18.34% -27.78% -27.27% 2.58% 
2 $2,112.0 $59.0 131.11 $0.45 4.92% 13.46% 12.50% 2.79% 
3 $1,926.0 $46.0 131.43 $0.35 -8.81% -22.03% -22.22% 2.39% 
4 $2,910.0 $90.0 132.35 $0.68 37.78% 52.54% 51.11% 3.09% 
1996 $2,163.0 $63.0 134.04 $0.47 NIA NIA NIA 2.91% 
2 $2,352.0 $75.0 136.36 $0.55 8.74% 19.05% 17.02$ 3.19% 
3 $2,210.0 $58.0 134.88 $0.43 -6.04% -22.67% -21.82% 2.62% 
4 $3,447.0 $110.0 137.50 $0.80 46.56% 46.67% 45.45% 3.19% 
1997 $2,604.0 $77.0 135.09 $0.57 -24.46% -30.00% -28.75% 2.96% 
2 $2,878.0 $83.0 136.07 $0.61 10.52% 7.79% 7.02% 2.88% 
3 $2,676.0 $67.0 136.73 $0.49 -7.02% -19.28% -19.67% 2.50% 
4 $3,876.0 $108.0 136.71 $0.79 34.68% 30.12% 29.51% 2.79% 
1998 $1,715.0 $89.0 269.70 $0.33 -55.75% -17.59% -58.23% 5.19% 
2 $1,927.0 $101.0 272.97 $0.37 12.36% 13.48% 12.12% 5.24% 
3 $1,804.0 $86.0 268.75 $0.32 -6.38% -14.85% -13.51% 4.77% 
4 $2,512.0 $114.0 259.09 $0.44 30.36% 12.87% 18.92% 4.54% 
•The quarterly sales (S) growth rate= (St1-St0)1St0xl 00%. 
bThe quarterly net income (NEI) growth rate= (NEit1-NEit0)/NEit0xl00%. 
cThe quarterly earnings per share (EPS) growth rate= (EPSt1-EPSt0)1EPSt0xl00%. 
dThe quarterly profit margin (NPR) = NElt01St0 xlOO%. 
t =time 
Note: Source is Marriott International Inc. (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000). 
To perform the analysis of the operating performance, selected financial indicators 
were calculated and analyzed. These indicators are discussed below. Because the acquisition 
of Ritz-Carlton was completed by the second quarter of 1995, an analysis of the impact of 
this diversification on operating performance was based on data from the first quarter on 
1994 to the last quarter of 1995. The first item analyzed was sales. Sales had a small increase 
during the second quarter of 1994, then decreased throughout the entire year 1994. During 
the first quarter of 1995, when basically the Ritz-Carlton chain was added to Marriott, sales 
increased by 18.34% compared to the previous quarter, showing improvement in selling 
performance. Then, during the second quarter of 1995, sales slightly increased by almost 5% 
to $2.11 billion. However, Marriott increased their ownership interest to approximately 98% 
on March 19, 1998, resulting in additional sales of $462 million in 1998. 
The net income grew steadily in 1994 as well as in 1995, with peaks in the fourth 
quarters of both years ($72 million in 1994 and $90 million in 1995). However, the trend of 
alternating positive and negative net income growth rates observed during the 1980s was 
present in 1994-1995 as well. This might also have been an effect of seasonality. 
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The earnings per share data indicated, similar to net income, the same pattern: 
increase through the years, but a slight decrease in the first quarters compared to the fourth 
quarters of the previous years. The quarterly earnings per share maintained at about $0.40 
being somehow similar to the situation in the 1980s. The net profit margin maintained around 
2.5% in all the eight quarters studied. However, the net profit margin in the last three quarters 
of 1995 show higher values than those of similar quarters of the previous year. As all the 
measures analyzed showed increase during the period when Ritz-Carlton was added to 
Marriott, it could be concluded that this acquisition improved Marriott's operating 
performance. 
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To examine the impact on performance of the decision to acquire Renaissance, data 
from the first quarter of 1996 to the last quarter of 1998 were analyzed. It was observed that 
the financial condition of Marriott improved from 1996 to 1998. The sales increased steadily, 
and so did the net income. Both sales and net income recorded growth rates in the range 10-
20%, meaning that the company still was growing rapidly. The net profit margin maintained 
around 3%, which, again, was typical for the hospitality industry. The earnings per share 
grew the same way as sales and net income, showing evidence of improved performance. 
Because the studied measures showed substantial increase, it could be concluded that the 
addition of Renaissance to Marriott's portfolio of brands improved the operating 
performance in late 1990s. 
In addition, the analysis of operating performance also considered the sales, net 
income, and earnings per share growth rates calculated for the same quarters in every year to 
minimize the effect of seasonality. Figure 2 shows a representation of sales, net income, and 




















Sales, net income, and earnings per share growth rates 
calculated for same quarter every year 
Year-quarter 
1-auarterfy sales growth rate - auarterly net income growth rate c:::JQuarterfy earnings per share growth rate I 
Figure 2. Sales, net income, and earnings per share growth rates 
adjusted for seasonality 1997-1999. (Marriott International Inc., 1996, 1997, 1998) 
From 1994 to 1989, the average sales growth rate was around 1.13%, because a big 
negative (-33.79%) annual sales growth rate in 1998. Instead, net income growth rate had an 
average of 18.32%. Earnings per share growth rate had an average of 3.12%, also due to a 
big negative value (-40.65%) in 1989. 
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Comparison with main competitor. Marriott's and Hilton's quarterly sales and 
earnmgs per share growth rates adjusted for seasonality for the periods when the new 
Marriott business segments entered operations were compared and summarized in the 
Figures 3 and 4. As seen from Figure 3, Marriott performed better than its competitor in 
quarterly sales growth rate, as Marriott's graphical representation of this measure is bigger. 
However, Marriott showed the tendency to have high negative values of sales growth rate 
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after 1998 when Hilton's measure increased. Also, from Figure 4, it seemed like, in general, 
Marriott was below its competitor and stayed steady, except for 1986 and 1987 when 
earnings per share growth rate decreased substantially. However, after 1998, Marriott's 










Quarterly sales growth rate for Marriott International Inc. and Hilton Hotels Corp adjusted for 
seasonality 1984-1989 and 1997·1998 
Years 
I-Marriott seasonal quarterly sales growth rate Cl Hilton seasonal quarterly sales growth rate I 
Figure 3. Quarterly sales growth rate for Marriott International Inc. and Hilton Hotels Corp. 
1984-1989 and 1997-1998 adjusted for seasonality (Hilton Hotels Corp. 1983, 1995, 1997, 
1998; Marriott Corporation, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 1987e, 
1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1990a, 1990b; Marriott International Inc., 








Quarterly earnings per share growth rate for Marriott International Inc. and Hiiton Hotels 
Corp. adjusted for seasonality 1984-1989 and 1997-1998 
Years 
/-Marriott seasonal quarterly EPS growth rate D Hilton seasonal quarterly EPS growth rate I 
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Figure 4. Quarterly earnings per share growth rates for Marriott International Inc. and Hilton 
Hotels Corp. 1984-1989 and 1997-1998 adjusted for seasonality (Hilton Hotels Corp. 1983, 
1995, 1997, 1998; Marriott Corporation, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 
1987d, 1987e, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1990a, 1990b;Marriott 
International Inc., 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000). 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of the Research 
The purpose of this case study was to examine if Marriott International Inc. added 
value through diversification from 1970 to 2000. Six diversification decisions were 
identified. These decisions were diversification into: (1) theme parks, (2) the moderate-priced 
hotel market (Courtyard), (3) full-service suite hotel market (Marriott Suites), (4) moderate-
priced suite hotel market (Residence Inns), (4) the luxury hotel market (Ritz-Carlton), and (6) 
the international hotel market (Renaissance). The decisions were discussed in detail, and the 
impact on market and operating performance was analyzed for each decision. 
To determine the impact of the diversification decisions on Marriott's market 
performance, the stock prices and returns from the days preceding, the day of, and following 
the public announcement of each decision were analyzed. This analysis found that the 
announcements related to these six diversification decisions created a positive market 
reaction, whereas the closing stock price increased an average of $1.17 per share or 2.57%. 
It was found that although diversification decisions had a positive impact on some of 
Marriott's operating performance measures (sales, net income, and net profit margin), 
diversification decisions did not irrefutably add value to Marriott based on all operating 
measures. At the time of theme parks diversification, net income, earnings per share, and net 
profit margin increased, but sales decreased. Despite small improvements to measures, 
Marriott continued opening of Courtyards by Marriott, Marriott Suites, and Residence Inns. 
This suggests that these brands created satisfactory operating performance in the minds of the 
corporate officers, even if operating performance measures seemed to suggest only moderate 
improvements. Therefore, this might be an indication that, ultimately, these new brands 
added value to the company. The decisions to acquire Ritz-Carlton and Renaissance had a 
small positive effect on Marriott's operating performance. Although none of the newly 
diversified businesses was already proven to contribute to the improvement of Marriott's 
operating performance, Marriott's performance in general continued to improve based both 
on operating and market measures. 
Given the large development of the hotel market in the U.S. from 1970 to 2000, 
Marriott wanted to make more money by diversifying into the hotel industry. The company 
found real growth opportunities and discovered it could apply its available skills to excel in 
the expanding hotel industry. Therefore, the conditions that prompted Marriott into the hotel 
industry were the numerous development opportunities, and the resources and skills that 
guaranteed their success. 
Limitations 
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This case study focused on one company, Marriott International Inc. This is because 
changes that transformed Marriott from a root beer stand into the today's lodging giant 
offered a unique opportunity to study the diversification decisions and impact of these 
decisions on the company's performance. The study addressed questions related to the 
conditions that prompted Marriott to diversify, the opportunities that the environment offered 
to Marriott, and the impact of diversification decisions on the firm's value. Such questions 
were difficult to address in a context of a large sample study. Also, by analyzing a single 
firm, this study captured, analyzed, and discussed elements involved in Marriott's 
diversification process. By doing this study on a large sample, the completeness of the 
analysis would be diminished. 
Because the study was conducted on a single company, generalization of results is 
limited. As each company in today's hospitality industry is unique, it is difficult to assume 
that what worked for Marriott would work for other companies. Also, because of its size, 
management capabilities, and resources, Marriott was able to seize environmental 
opportunities while others may not have had that ability. A final limitation of the study was 
its focus only on six decisions from 1970 to 2000. Due to lack of data, it is not possible to 
analyze decisions prior to 1968. 
Future Research 
This research indicates opportunities for additional studies to further study the 
relationship between diversification and firms' value in aspects of the hospitality industry. 
This type of study should be conducted using a large sample of firms, to permit 
generalization. Moreover, it would be interesting to replicate this study using other greater or 
lesser diversified hospitality firms. 
Despite the limitations of the Marriott case study and the limited concrete connection 
between specific diversification decisions and basic operating and market performance, it is 
evident that changing from foodservice to a hotel firm added value. Moreover, this type of 
research can serve as a foundation for additional studies attempting to explore and quantify 
the diversification-value relationship in the hospitality industry. 
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APPENDIX. Calculation of Operating and Market Performance Measures 
Calculation of Net Sales Growth (SALG) 
s s 
SALG 1 0 x 100 (Percentage) 
So 
S1 =net sales for the current period (quarter or year) 
So =net sales for the previous period (quarter or year) 
61 
Net sales = Rental income + leased income + operating income + finance charges -
(income from discontinued operations + interest income + non-operating income + other 
income) 
Calculation of rate of growth in earnings after taxes and preferred dividends (P ATG). 
PAT PAT 
P ATG 1 0 x 100 (Percentage) 
PAT0 
PAT 1 = net income for the current period (quarter or year) 
PAT0 =net income for the previous period (quarter or year) 
Calculation of rate of growth in earnings per common share (EPSG). 
EPS EPS 
EPSG 1 0 x 100 (Percentage) 
EPS0 
EPS1 =Earnings per common share for the current period (quarter or year) 
EPS0 =Earnings per common share for the previous period (quarter or year) 
EPS =Net Income I Number of shares of common stock outstanding 
Calculation After Tax Return on Equity (ROE). 
ROE PAT 
TE 
PAT= net income for the current period (quarter or year) 
TE = total equity 
Calculation After Tax Return on Assets (ROA). 
ROA PAT 
TA 
PAT = net income for the current period (quarter or year) 
TA = total assets 
Calculation of net profit margin (NPRM). 
PAT NPRM --x 100 (Percentage) s 
PAT = Net income for the current period (quarter or year) 
S =Net sales for the current period (quarter or year) 
Calculation of accounts receivable turnover (ARTO). 
AR ARTO -x365(Days) s 
AR= Accounts receivable for the current period (quarter or year) 
S =Net sales for the current period (quarter or year) 
Calculation of total assets turnover (ATO). 
ATO ~ 
TA 
S =Net sales for the current period (quarter or year) 
TA= Total assets for the current period (quarter or year) 
Calculation of debt to equity (DEQ). 
DEQ TD 
TE 
TD =Total debt for the current period (quarter or year) 
TE= Total equity for the current period (quarter or year) 
Calculation of price to earnings (PE). 
PE MKPS 
DES 
MKPS = Market price per share 
DES= Diluted earnings per share 
Calculation of market-to-book ratio (MTB). 
MTB MKPS 
BKPS 
MKPS = Market price per share 
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BKPS =Book value per share= (Total shareholders' equity - preferred stock equity) I 
Number of common shares outstanding 
